Introduction, bimatrix games
The bimatrix game is defined by two m × n dimension payoff matrices. U = (u ij ) and V = (v ij ) where i = 1, . . . , m , j = 1, . . . , n are pure strategies of the first and second player correspondingly [1] . The mixed strategies are denoted by x i , y j where x i , y j are probabilities. Formally 
Definition 3. A pair (x, y) is the Nash Equilibrium (NE) if it satisfies following conditions:
U (x, y) U max = max n j=1 u ij y j i = 1, . . . , m ,
V (x, y) V max = max
In [1] the bimatrix games were reduced to bilinear programming and the algorithm defining NE was proposed. However, at the time there are no algorithms for NE of the general bimatrix problem. In this paper an MSE algorithm of polynomial complexity was proposed, and implemented for a special class of bimatrix game, so called Generalized Inspector Problem which properties are defined by Theorem 2. In contrast to the general Lemke algorithm [1] , the MSE algorithm requires solutions of a finite sequence of linear programming problems instead of the bilinear programming problem which is NP-complete. In both the matrices U and V of the Inspector Problem, all the column elements and all the raw elements are equal (with exception of the diagonal elements). This enables the explicit solution of complexity O(m).
Theorem 1.
A pair of strictly mixed strategies (x, y) is the Nash equilibrium of the bimatrix game (u ij ), (v ij ) if and only if there exist real numbers α ir β, such that
Proof. Is in [2] . ⊓ ⊔
Inspector problem
A simple version of the Inspector problem was considered in [2, 3] . Here we regard more general setup which allows formulation and solution broader family of problems, including the optimization of the security services. The general inspector problem is defined by matrix (a ij ) -m × n, m n, where elements a ij , i = 1, . . . , m, j = 1, . . . , n describe inspection actions and parameters. The set of inspection objects is denoted by M = {1, 2, . . . , m}, inspection actions are defined by vector
and inspection parameters are represented by vector
Let's consider quadratic game m × m. Define the payoffs of the first player by matrices (u ij ) with elements
and initial conditions:
The payoffs of the second player are defined by matrix (v ij ) with elements
and initial conditions
Here
are real functions of vectors c i and c j . The objective is to define mixed strategies x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) and y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y m ), satisfying equilibrium conditions (1) and (2).
Optimal strategies
The first player is setting such mixed strategies that the payoff of the second player would be independent on its strategies:
The second player is setting such mixed strategies that the payoff of the first player would be independent on its strategies:
Then it follows from Theorem 1 that,
Explicit solution
Let's solve system of Eqs. (4)- (7) with variables x i , y i , α, β, i = 1, . . . , m. It follows from expressions (4), (6), (8) that
Therefore,
By solving (5), (7), (8) we define that
Then it follows from equalities U (x, y) ir V (x, y). From (6), (9) follows that
By solving system of equalities (7), (9) one defines that
.
(12)
Search for the Nash equilibrium
In this paper a Modification of the Strategy Elimination Algorithm (MSE) is proposed when elimination of negative solutions x i < 0 and y i < 0 is performed by different players independently. The proof will be given that this algorithm provides the Nash equilibrium. The pseudo-code follows:
NoSolutions ← false, V ← 1+S2 S1 , j ← 1 7.
for i ← 1 to n do 8.
if V g v (c hi ) and f hi > 0 or V < g v (c hi ) and f hi < 0 then 9.
h j ← h i , j ← j + 1 10. else 11.
n ← j − 1 13. for i ← 1 to n do 14.
Steps 1-3 perform initialization, calculation of partial payoffs S 1 , S 2 and output of parameter h i defining the inspection objects remaining after elimination. Steps 4-12 are for elimination of negative solutions; during each iteration the non-negativity of solution x hi is tested (line 8). Iteration is repeated after the elimination of negative solutions x hi and updating of expected payoff V * (x * , y * ). Algorithm stops after elimination of all negative solutions. Steps 13-15 perform output of solutions x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ). The mixed strategy of the second player is defined similarily by the algorithm
Theorem 2. The MSE algorithm provides Nash Equilibrium
Proof. In the worst case, the MSE algorithm read lists m−1 i=0 (m − i) times, so the algorithm is finite and of polynomial complexity O(m 2 ). MSE do not generate strictly negative solutions x * ir y * since i x * i = 1 ir j y * i = 1 and negative solutions are eliminated at each iteration during MSE steps 5-12 until the positive solution x * is returned after the finite number of iterations If only positive solutions x * = (x p1 , x p2 , . . . , x p k ) are produced then from Theorem 1 it follows that x * is the NE regarding the objects p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p k . Now we show that x * also is NE regarding all the objects. Suppose that M = {1, 2, . . . , m} and
therefore solution x * = (x p1 , x p2 , . . . , x p k ) satisfy equlibrium condition (2) . If solution y * = (y r1 , y r2 , . . . , y r l ) is positive, then from Theorem 1 follows that it is NE regarding r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r l objects. Using arguments similar to those applied considering solution x * we show that y * is NE regarding all the inspection objects. Suppose that R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r l }. Then it follows from inequality (14) that
Consequently, the solution y * = (y r1 , y r2 , . . . , y r l ) satisfies equilibrium condition (1):
Therefore the solution of MSE algorithm (x * , y * ) is NE regarding all the inspection objects. ⊓ ⊔
Example, optimization of security system
Denote by (a ij ) a matrix describing system parameters
Here M = {1, 2, . . . , m} is a set of objects protected by the system and the protective actionas are represented as
Parameters of protected object are denoted by
The payoff of the security system is represented by the matrix (u ij ):
The offenders payoff is described by the matrix (v ij ) with elements
It follows from (9), (10), (11), (12) the explicit, not necessarily positive, solutions:
, j = 1, . . . , m.
According to Theorem 2, the NE solution (x, y) can be defined by corresponding iterations of MSE algorithm sequentially eliminating a set of protected objects m i , where g i (p i − p i q i + q i ) > 0, i = 1, . . . , m, and using the explicit solution for the remaining objects. 
Experimental investigation
The MSE algorithm was implemented by Maple16. The testing was performed by random generation of 100 samples of the U , V matrices of both the game models. All samples succeeded. The results are in Fig. 1 where the X axis shows the iteration number and the Y axis denotes the number of eliminated solutions during a single iteration. Different lines show different experiments.
Conclusion
The Generalized Inspector Problem (GIP) introduced in this paper extends the family of problems. The improved MSE algorithm provides solution of GIP with the convergence rate O(m). The experiments show that the software implementation reflects the mathematical results and indicates the improved convergence rate O(m log m).
